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An Industry in Crisis: Nonbank Mortgage Servicers 
and the CARES Act Mortgage Forbearance 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic levied an unprecedented hardship on 
millions of Americans.1 However, certain industries have been 
legislatively coaxed into bearing a much larger share of the hardship than 
they had expected.2  In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus 
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) in response to 
the overwhelming economic burden imposed by the COVID-19 
pandemic.3  While the CARES Act was necessary to help homeowners 
weather the COVID-19 pandemic,4 it accomplishes this by placing 
mortgage servicers in a challenging position.5 
The CARES Act contains a provision that allows mortgagors to 
request forbearance6 on their mortgage payments for up to one year.7  
This provision is helpful to mortgagors who could not pay their bills 
during the pandemic by deferring their mortgage payments for the period 
 
1. See Karan Kaul & Laurie Goodman, The Price Tag for Keeping 29 Million Families in 
Their Homes: $162 Billion, URBAN INST.: URBAN WIRE (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/price-tag-keeping-29-million-families-their-homes-162-
billion [https://perma.cc/2JU6-9DUB] (highlighting the economic impact the COVID-19 
crisis has had on millions of Americans). 
2. See Laurence Platt, Mortgage Servicers Are Getting the Short End of the Stick Under 
the CARES Act, HOUS. WIRE (June 5, 2020, 3:10 PM), 
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/pulse-mortgage-servicers-are-getting-the-short-end-
of-the-stick-under-the-cares-act/ [https://perma.cc/S4LU-WR94] (discussing the position 
mortgage servicers have been placed in by the “CARES” Act mortgage forbearance). 
3. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 
134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9001). 
4. See Kaul & Goodman, supra note 1 (explaining the economic impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on homeowners). 
5. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the position mortgage servicers have been placed in 
by the “CARES” Act mortgage forbearance). 
6. Forbearance, in this context, means the cessation of normally required payments under 
a loan for a set period of time, but does not stop accrual of payments owed during that period.  




20in%20the%20future [https://perma.cc/9E2C-E6BZ] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020). 
7. § 4022, 134 Stat. at 490–91. 
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of the forbearance.8  In practice, the provision requires mortgage 
servicers9 to continue advancing payments on mortgage-backed 
securities,10 which they are contractually obligated to make although they 
no longer receive payments on the underlying loans.11  As a result, the 
CARES Act’s mortgage forbearance provision created a liquidity crisis 
for mortgage servicers.12 
Many stakeholders have highlighted the desperate need for 
federal aid in the mortgage servicing industry because they recognize the 
necessity of the mortgage servicing industry to the broader housing 
market.13  The impact of the CARES Act will be more severe for nonbank 
 
8. See § 4022, 134 Stat. at 490–91.  (explaining the forbearance provision under Section 
4022(b) of the Act); see also KARAN KAUL & TED TOZER, THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL LIQUIDITY 
FACILITY FOR GOVERNMENT LOAN SERVICING 1 (2020), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102580/the-need-for-a-federal-
liquidity-facility-for-government-loan-servicing_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LUU-F53C] 
(“[Four million two-hundred thousand] homeowners were in forbearance plans at the end of 
June.”). 
9. Mortgage servicing involves the collection of payments due from the borrower under a 
mortgage loan and the disbursement of those funds to principal and interest balances and to 
the owners or investors in the loan. Other important responsibilities of mortgage servicers 
include customer service, billing, and management of delinquencies, losses, and foreclosed 
properties.  See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, REENGINEERING NONBANK 
SUPERVISION, CHAPTER THREE: OVERVIEW OF NONBANK MORTGAGE 27 (2019), 
https://www.csbs.org/system/files/2020-08/chapter_three_-
_overview_of_nonbank_mortgage_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KNK2-GMJF] (explaining the 
general duties that mortgage servicers provide). 
10. See Fast Answers: Mortgage Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmortgagesecuritieshtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/N856-TEZ5] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (“Mortgage-backed securities are 
debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most 
commonly on residential property. Mortgage loans are purchased from banks, mortgage 
companies, and other originators and then assembled into pools . . . represent[ing] claims on 
the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on loans in the pool . . . .”). 
11. See Platt, supra note 2 (highlighting the difficulties caused by the mortgage forbearance 
of the CARES Act). 
12. § 4022, 134 Stat., at 490–91; see also Platt, supra note 2 (stating that the COVID-19 
environment, under the CARES Act mortgage forbearance, creates a liquidity risk). 
13. See, e.g., Mike Sorohan, MBA Urges Feds to Take Immediate Further Steps on Market 
Stabilization, Liquidity, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://newslink.mba.org/mba-newslinks/2020/march/mba-newslink-monday-march-23-
2020/mba-urges-feds-to-take-urgent-steps-on-market-stabilization-liquidity/ 
[https://perma.cc/A4LR-JHF8] (discussing the need for liquidity and federal assistance in the 
mortgage servicing industry). 
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mortgage servicers14 than for bank-owned mortgage servicers15 because 
nonbank mortgage servicers lack access to the federal lending facilities 
that are available to bank servicers.16 
This Note proceeds in five parts and endeavors to suggest a 
solution for nonbank mortgage servicers facing this liquidity crisis that is 
both compliant with the CARES Act mortgage regulations and realistic. 
Part II provides background on the mortgage servicing industry.17  
Part III analyzes why the COVID-19 crisis is more damaging to nonbank 
mortgage servicers than to their bank counterparts.18  Part IV provides 
suggestions for solving the problem and addresses some immediate 
concerns surrounding the solution19 before briefly summarizing and 
concluding in Part V.20 
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE MORTGAGE SERVICING INDUSTRY 
A. The Role of Mortgage Servicers 
Mortgage servicers are responsible for collecting and 
subsequently recording payments from mortgagors to apply to their 
principal and interest balances.21  They also distribute the funds received 
to the owner of the loan and toward the payment of taxes and insurance.22  
Mortgage servicers effectively support the market for mortgage-backed 
securities by servicing loans that are pooled and backing the payment of 
these securities.23  Nonbank mortgage servicers play a major role in the 
 
14. Nonbank mortgage servicers are non-depository institutions that perform the function 
mortgage servicing.  See Roberto Hernandez et al., The Changing Dynamics of the Mortgage 
Servicing Landscape 5 (Mortgage Bankers Assoc., White Paper, 2015), 
https://mba.informz.net/MBA/data/images/15217_MBA_PWC_White_Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/33RY-JL6U] (defining nonbank mortgage servicer). 
15. Bank-owned mortgage servicers are federal and state-chartered banks that, in their role 
as a depository institution, perform mortgage servicing, often for loans they originate.  Id. 
16. See Platt, supra note 2 (acknowledging that no servicing advance facilities exist under 
the Federal Reserve or Treasury for nonbank mortgage servicers). 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part V. 
21. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9 (explaining the role 
mortgage servicers play in the payment of mortgage loans).  
22. See id. (explaining the responsibilities of mortgage servicers). 
23. See id.  (stating “remittance of payment to the applicable investors” as an integral part 
of mortgage servicing). 
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market for mortgage servicing rights24 (“MSRs”).25  Mortgage servicers 
earn a profit by charging a servicing fee in exchange for performing all 
of the previously outlined activities.26 
 Either the government or a mortgage lender may require a 
mortgage servicer to extend a loan to a homeowner to cover principal and 
interest payments that the homeowners have missed, which is paid to the 
investors until the borrower can make the payments or the property is 
foreclosed upon.27  This arrangement between the mortgage servicer and 
the investors is referred to as a servicing advance and the payments are 
referred to as advances.28  If a borrower defaults, then a mortgage servicer 
will be paid through the guarantor—assuming that the loan is 
guaranteed—or through foreclosure and sale of the property, which 
servicers often manage.29 
Nonbank mortgage servicers are companies that are not a part of 
and have no affiliations with any depository institutions, but nonetheless 
engage in the business of mortgage servicing.30  Despite their integral role 
in the mortgage market, nonbank mortgage servicers have not always 
played a major role in mortgage servicing.31 
Historically, banks and thrifts have dominated the mortgage 
servicing industry.32  However, widespread thrift insolvency during the 
 
24. “[A] Mortgage Servicing Right (MSR) is the contractual right to service a mortgage 
loan; according to accounting standards, entities owning MSRs must perform a valuation 
analysis and appropriately recognize the value of the MSR portfolio on the company balance 
sheet.” Id. at 28. 
25. See Kayla Shoemaker, Trends in Mortgage Origination and Servicing: Nonbanks in 
the Post-Crisis Period, 13 FDIC QUARTERLY 51, 57 (2019), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2019-vol13-4/fdic-v13n4-3q2019-
article3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QQT-U5PD] (explaining the role of nonbank mortgage 
servicers and investors in the MSR market). 
26. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 28–29 (explaining how 
mortgage servicers are compensated). 
27. See Paul Jackson, Fed Looks to Ease Burden of Servicing Advances, HOUS. WIRE (Mar. 
20, 2020, 9:32 AM), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/fed-looks-ease-burden-servicing-
advances/#:~:text=Mortgage%20servicing%20advances%20are%20loans,property%20is%2
0sold%20out%20of [https://perma.cc/49AN-RVUP] (explaining the concept of servicing 
advances). 
28. See id. (defining servicing advances and the arrangement between mortgage servicers 
and the owners of the loans they service). 
29. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the methods of recourse for a mortgage servicer in 
the event of a default); see also CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9 
(explaining briefly mortgage servicers role in foreclosure proceedings). 
30. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 52 (defining nonbank mortgage servicers). 
31. See id. at 51–53 (explaining the historical shift in the market from bank mortgage 
servicers to the prevalence of nonbank mortgage servicers). 
32. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 29 (explaining the 
historical dominance of banks and thrifts in mortgage servicing). 
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savings and loan crisis (“S & L Crisis”) of the 1980s led to a sharp decline 
in bank and thrift market share in lending, which left a void in mortgage 
lending that was eventually filled by a growing number of nonbanks.33  
Additionally, interest rates rose significantly in the early 1980s.34  This 
had a profound negative impact on savings and loan associations because 
of their practice of borrowing short term and lending long term, which 
made them unable to adjust their mortgage interest rates to the rising 
interest rates and competition for deposits.35  A combination of these 
factors and deregulation of the savings and loan industry led to 
widespread insolvency in the market.36 
The S & L Crisis, combined with the rise of securitization and 
mortgage-backed securities, provided nonbank mortgage servicers with 
an opportunity to enter the market.37  Between the 1990s and into the 
early 2000s, financial technology, such as automatic credit scoring tools 
and automated loan servicing management tools, led to more efficient 
mortgage servicing methods.38  These tools aided the growth and 
expansion of the mortgage servicing industry for banks and nonbanks 
alike.39 
From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the total market for 
servicing subprime loans40 doubled from $280 billion to $585 billion.41  
 
33. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 51 (discussing the decline of banks and thrifts in 
mortgage lending historically). 
34. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SAVINGS & LOAN CRISIS 7 
(1992), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/102nd-congress-1991-
1992/reports/1992_01_theeconeffectsofthesavings.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y3T-FPD2] 
(discussing the increase in the interest rates in the early 1980s). 
35. See id.  (discussing savings and loan lending practices at the time of the crisis). 
36. See id.  at 7–9 (explaining how losses combined with deregulation accelerated the 
crisis). 
37. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 29–30 (analyzing the 
factors leading to nonbank mortgage servicers entering the mortgage servicing market). 
38. See Amy C. Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart 
Enough to Keep People in Their Houses?  13 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004), 
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/fmwp_0403_servicing_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8RAV-C5N9] (discussing how financial technology helped lead to more 
efficient mortgage servicing methods). 
39. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 29 (explaining the role 
of technology in the propagation of the mortgage servicing industry). 
40. Subprime lending is the practice of offering loans at a rate, higher than the prime rate, 
to borrowers with limited or poor credit history.  Subprime Lending, OFF. OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (last visited Oct. 12, 2020), 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/credit/retail-credit/subprime-
lending.html [https://perma.cc/6XNP-3XUH]. 
41. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 30 (discussing the 
market value of subprime loans historically). 
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In 2006, nonbank mortgage servicers were responsible for approximately 
33% of all mortgage servicing.42  By 2007, the market reached $1.05 
trillion before the beginning of the 2008 Financial Crisis.43  At this time, 
nonbank servicers held approximately 60% of the subprime loan 
servicing market.44  But the apparent success of nonbank mortgage 
servicers was short-lived.45 
 
B. The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Impact on the Mortgage 
Servicing Industry 
The 2008 Financial Crisis devastated the nonbank mortgage 
servicing industry.46  Many lenders and servicers faced insolvency and 
bankruptcy as a result of a massive wave of borrowers being unable to 
make their mortgage payments.47  Many servicers and lenders either 
exited the market, involuntarily through insolvency and bankruptcy, or 
merged with others to survive.48  Nonbank mortgage servicers dropped 
from approximately 33% of all mortgage servicing in 2006 to a meager 
6% in 2010, effectively destroying nonbank mortgage servicers’ market 
share that boomed over the prior decade.49 
This massive wave of defaults on high-risk subprime mortgages 
was a catalyst for the 2008 Financial Crisis.50  The impact of these 
defaults was felt by banks that had large portfolios of subprime 
mortgages.51  Later investigation by the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
 
42. See id. (discussing historical nonbank mortgage servicing trends). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See id. at 30–31 (explaining the effects of the subprime loan crisis and the impact of 
the 2008 Financial Crisis on nonbank mortgage servicers). 
46. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 54 (discussing widespread insolvency and economic 
troubles due to the financial crisis). 
47. See id. (highlighting the insolvency many nonbank mortgage servicers faced during the 
financial crisis). 
48. See id. (explaining the historical effect of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the mortgage 
industry). 
49. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 30 (announcing 
statistics regarding market share of nonbank mortgage servicers after the 2008 Financial 
Crisis). 
50. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 256 (2011), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/79A5-YRUM] (explaining the billions in losses on subprime loans which 
played a part in the 2008 Financial Crisis). 
51. See id.  at 256–57 (describing the impact of subprime loan losses on large banks in the 
financial sector). 
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Commission52 concluded that this crisis could have been avoided, but the 
warning signs were ignored.53  Although the 2008 Financial Crisis and 
the subprime mortgage crisis were painful blows, the country had to learn 
from the experience and soldier on.54 
 
C. Post-Financial Crisis and the Modern Role of Mortgage 
Servicers 
Mortgage servicers were beginning to recover from the Financial 
Crisis when a number of regulatory changes shifted the economic 
landscape and allowed for increased nonbank participation in the 
mortgage servicing market.55  In 2013, the Basel III56 capital 
requirements for depository institutions limited the amount of mortgage 
servicing rights that banks could hold.57  Mortgage servicing rights are a 
type of mortgage servicing asset (“MSA”), which is considered an asset 
if the net present value of the cash flows exceeds the cost to service the 
asset, and a liability if the cash flows do not exceed the cost to service the 
asset.58  These MSAs are risk-weighted at 100%, until they exceed a 
specified statutory threshold, at which point the risk-weight is increased 
to 250%, effectively requiring banks to have far more capital to comply 
with regulations for MSAs beyond this capital threshold.59 
The capital requirements imposed by Basel III limited the amount 
of mortgage servicing rights to a percentage of a bank’s capital, which 
 
52. See id. at xi (“The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was created to ‘examine the 
causes of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States.’”) 
53. See id.  at xvi (concluding that the 2008 Financial Crisis was avoidable). 
54. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 32–33 (discussing the 
end of the crisis and mortgage servicers recovering from the crisis). 
55. See id. (highlighting the conditions which allowed for nonbank participation in the 
mortgage markets). 
56. Basel III is a group of proposals, proposed by the Basel Committee, that were adopted 
in a final rule by U.S. bank regulators in July 2013, containing inter alia capital requirements 
for banks.  See generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK 
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 617–19 (5th ed. 2018) (providing background on the Basel III 
capital ratios). 
57. 12 C.F.R. § 217 (2020) (implementing Basel III capital adequacy standards to state 
member banks); see also CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 32–33 
(discussing the effects of Basel III regulations on the mortgage servicing market).  
58. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 28 (explaining how 
MSAs are kept on a balance sheet). 
59. See Adam Freedman et al., The Impact of Recent Changes in Capital Requirements on 
Mortgage Servicing Assets, BANK POLICY INST. (June 25, 2019), https://bpi.com/the-impact-
of-recent-changes-in-capital-requirements-on-mortgage-servicing-assets/ 
[https://perma.cc/6YE9-8HYE] (discussing the risk-weighted capital requirements for MSAs 
in banks under the Basel III). 
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meant banks were limited on how many of these assets they were able to 
hold while staying within their required regulatory limits.60  These capital 
requirements did not apply to nonbank mortgage servicers.61  As a result, 
nonbank mortgage servicers were able to gain market share with limited 
competition.62  The share of nonbank mortgages issued also increased in 
the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis because of their low credit 
requirements, especially as compared to those of banks.63 
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, many nonbank mortgage 
servicers and originators grew in market share.64  During the first quarter 
of 2020, the nonbank share of agency servicers65 had grown to 53% of 
the agency servicing market, up from just 24% in 2014.66  This growing 
market share is attributed to the ability of nonbanks to specialize and 
reduce the costs associated with servicing loans.67  One form of 
specialization which aided in the proliferation of nonbank mortgage 
servicers was the introduction of enhanced technology to the mortgage 
servicing industry.68  For example, the implementation of online 
services—which automatically collect information pertaining to a 
borrower’s financial status and history—allows a lender to more quickly 
and efficiently make an approval decision based on these online 
applications 69 
 
60. See id.  (explaining the impact of minimum capital standards adopted from the Basel 
III on bank mortgage servicers). 
61. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 33 (explaining the 
emergence of nonbank mortgage servicers in the mortgage servicing market post-crisis). 
62. See id.  (explaining the emergence of nonbank mortgage servicers into the mortgage 
servicing market post-crisis). 
63. See You Suk Kim et al., Mapping the Boom in Nonbank Mortgage Lending—and 
Understanding the Risks, BROOKINGS (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2018/09/10/mapping-the-boom-in-nonbank-mortgage-lending-and-understanding-the-
risks/ [https://perma.cc/NA2K-42H8] (analyzing nonbank mortgage issuing practices as 
compared to banks post-financial crisis). 
64. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 54 (discussing market share for nonbank mortgage 
originators and servicers). 
65. Agency servicers are those who service loans guaranteed by government sponsored 
entities or the Government National Mortgage Loan Association.  CONFERENCE OF STATE 
BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 55. 
66. See id.  (announcing statistics of nonbank mortgage servicers share of agency servicing 
in the market). 
67. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 55 (analyzing factors for increased market share for 
nonbank mortgage servicers post-crisis). 
68. See id.  (stating that technological innovation played a role in the growth of the nonbank 
market post-crisis). 
69.See ANDREAS FUSTER ET AL., THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN MORTGAGE LENDING, 1 
(2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr836.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TB5F-DR7Z] (explaining the role of technology in the mortgage servicing 
industry). 
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III.  LIQUIDITY SHORTAGE FOR NONBANK MORTGAGE SERVICERS 
A. The CARES Act Mortgage Forbearance Ramifications for 
Mortgage Servicers 
The CARES Act provided a $2.2 trillion economic stimulus 
package, passed with the express purpose of addressing the economic 
crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.70  The Act contains a provision 
that is particularly disadvantageous to mortgage servicers, stating that, 
“[d]uring the covered period, a borrower with a [f]ederally backed 
mortgage loan experiencing a financial hardship due, directly or 
indirectly, to the COVID-19 emergency may request forbearance on the 
[f]ederally backed mortgage loan, regardless of delinquency status.”71  
For a borrower to obtain forbearance, the borrower is only required to 
request forbearance from the mortgage servicer, and confirm that the 
“financial hardship” is a result of the COVID-19 crisis.72  The provision 
states that, “[u]pon receiving a request for forbearance from a borrower . 
. . the servicer shall with no additional documentation required other than 
the borrower’s attestation to a financial hardship caused by the COVID-
19 emergency . . . provide the forbearance.”73  This period of forbearance 
is to last an initial 180-days and at the borrower’s request may be 
extended up to an additional 180-days, subject to the borrower’s right to 
shorten this period at the borrower’s election.74  There are additional 
provisions relevant to mortgage servicers under the CARES Act which 
grant a limited forbearance to multifamily borrowers with federally 
backed loans.75  Another relevant provision mandates a 120-day period 
from the enactment of the act that prevents any eviction proceedings 
against any tenants with, among other things, a federally backed 
mortgage loan.76 
 
70. See generally Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security ("CARES”) Act, Pub. 
L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9001); see also What’s in 
the $2 Trillion Coronavirus Relief Package?, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Mar. 
25, 2020), http://www.crfb.org/blogs/whats-2-trillion-coronavirus-relief-package 
[https://perma.cc/YP5S-EX8A] (discussing the “CARES” Act allocation of funds and the 
purpose of the Act). 




75. See § 4023, 134 Stat. at 491–492 (allowing multifamily mortgage servicers to request 
forbearance due to a COVID-19 related financial hardship and sets forth the relevant 
restrictions to the provision). 
76. See § 4024, 134 Stat. at 492–494 (providing a federal moratorium on eviction filings). 
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On December 27, 2020, Congress enacted the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”)77, which provides for an 
extension of the eviction moratorium78 and emergency rental assistance 
payments.79 While incredibly helpful to renters, it does little to address 
the real issue that this pandemic has levied against mortgage servicers for 
the prior nine months of forbearance.80 
The statutory right of forbearance provided to the nation’s 
homeowners, landlords, and tenants has disrupted the stream of payments 
to mortgage servicers.81  This disruption places servicers between the 
borrowers and the owners of the loans, where they cannot collect 
payments on the mortgages they service.82  Furthermore, the CARES Act 
does nothing to address the fact that mortgage servicers are still 
contractually obligated to continue making payments to the owners of the 
mortgage-backed securities on the loans they service.83   
In the case of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”),84 the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”),85 or the 
 
77. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260 (2020). 
78. See Consolidated Appropriations Act § 502 (“The order issued by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention . . . entitled ‘Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions To 
Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19’ . . . is extended through January 31, 2021, 
notwithstanding the effective dates specified in such Order.”). 
79. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act § 501 (providing emergency funding 
for the purposes of rental assistance to individuals who are struggling financially because of 
the COVID-19 pandemic). 
80. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, § 501–02 
(2020); see also Platt, supra note 2 (“[M]ortgage servicers are required to shoulder the short-
term financial burden of the natural consequences of providing forbearance to such residential 
mortgage borrowers without, in the views of many, the benefit of just compensation from the 
federal government.”). 
81. See Platt, supra note 2 (stating that the CARES Act mortgage forbearance has disrupted 
mortgage servicers payment streams). 
82. See id. (discussing how the mortgage forbearance provision has disrupted the payments 
mortgage servicers expected to receive). 
83. See id. (explaining the “unfair” position mortgage servicers have been placed in by the 
CARES Act mortgage forbearance). 
84. The Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) is a government sponsored 
enterprise that purchases and guarantees single family mortgage loans, issues debt securities 
to investors, and converts multifamily mortgage loans into MBS, which provides liquidity to 
the market.  See What We Do, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/about-us/what-we-
do [https://perma.cc/969P-9TSM] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (explaining Fannie Mae’s 
function and business activities). 
85. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) is a government 
sponsored enterprise that buys mortgage loans on the secondary market and sells them as 
MBS to provide liquidity to the market.  See Our Business, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/about/business/ [https://perma.cc/FF2R-V325] (last visited Oct. 
12, 2020) (explaining Freddie Mac’s function and business activities). 
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Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”),86 mortgage 
servicers are required to make scheduled payments to the holders of those 
securities.87  However, the mortgage servicers are no longer receiving 
payments from mortgagors who invoked forbearance, creating a liquidity 
challenge for mortgage servicers.88  Under the CARES Act mortgage 
forbearance, mortgage servicers are only temporarily denied funds they 
are due as the servicers of their loans.89  Therefore, the concern is the 
immediate impact of the forbearance.90  Mortgage servicers could not 
have predicted that they would be unable to collect those payments due 
to a legislative action designed to protect the interests of mortgagors.91  
Mortgage servicers now bear the economic risk of borrowers’ 
forbearance, which was not considered when they entered into servicing 
agreements.92 
In April 2020,  the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) 
announced that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would limit the servicer 
obligation to advance mortgage-backed securities payments to four 
months for loans in forbearance.93  While the FHFA’s actions are helpful 
to mortgage servicers, a liquidity facility is still needed to handle the large 
number of loans in forbearance and resolve the four months for which 
mortgage servicers will still be required to cover payments on mortgage-
 
86. The Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) provides guarantees 
on the “timely payment of principal and interest on MBS backed by federally insured or 
guaranteed loans.” Funding Government Lending, GINNIE MAE, 
https://www.ginniemae.gov/about_us/who_we_are/Pages/funding_government_lending.asp
x [https://perma.cc/DN3N-ZZUB] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020). 
87. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the payments due under MBS guaranteed by 
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) like Fannie Mae, which requires principal and 
interest, and Freddie Mac, which requires only interest be advanced). 
88. See id.  (discussing that mortgage servicers are not receiving payments under the 
forbearance provision of the CARES Act). 
89. See id. (discussing the short-term liquidity risks for mortgage servicers created by the 
CARES Act mortgage forbearance). 
90. See id. (discussing the short-term impact of the mortgage forbearance on mortgage 
servicers). 
91. See id.  (discussing the inability of mortgage servicers to account for the risk of a 
pandemic). 
92.See id.  (“[Mortgage servicers] did not realistically contemplate the impacts of required 
forbearance for the significant number of loans impacted by the global pandemic in allocating 
the risks in the servicing agreements.”). 
93.See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Addresses Servicer Liquidity 
Concerns, Announces Four Month Advance Obligation Limit for Loans in Forbearance (Apr. 
21, 2020), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Addresses-Servicer-
Liquidity-Concerns-Announces-Four-Month-Advance-Obligation-Limit-for-Loans-in-
Forbearance.aspx [https://perma.cc/PY6U-HXHW] (announcing a cap to mortgage servicer 
payment advancing obligations for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
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backed securities.94  The fact that there is a limit to the amount that 
mortgage servicers will be required to advance does not negate the four 
months of payment that servicers are burdened with in the meantime.95  
Furthermore, if mortgage servicers are expected to advance payments for 
four months of the potentially one year forbearance period, short-term 
liquidity issues are almost a certainty.96 
 
B. The Disproportionate Impact of the Mortgage Forbearance on 
Nonbank Mortgage Servicers 
 
The CARES Act mortgage forbearance impacts nonbank 
mortgage servicers more severely than bank mortgage servicers because 
they do not benefit from the federal safety nets and lending facilities that 
safeguard the stability of banks.97  Banks have deposit insurance provided 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and have access 
to the Federal Reserve as the “lender of last resort”98 which provides 
banks with liquidity through discount window lending for both short-term 
and more severe liquidity needs.99  No such comparable lending facilities 
currently exist for nonbank mortgage servicers.100 
Nonbank mortgage servicers also tend to have fewer 
“unencumbered assets” than banks do in the event of a liquidity 
 
94. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (discussing why the four-month cap by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac is not necessarily going to completely solve the crisis). 
95. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the short-term financial burden that mortgage 
servicers are being forced to bear under the CARES Act mortgage forbearance). 
96. See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, supra note 93 (announcing a four-month 
cap to mortgage servicer payment advancing obligations); see also Platt, supra note 2 
(discussing the liquidity issues likely to arise for mortgage servicers under the forbearance). 
97. See Joe Light, Mortgage Firms Teeter Near Crisis That Regulators Saw Coming, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-
03/mortgage-servicers-teeter-near-crisis-that-regulators-saw-coming 
[https://perma.cc/Y98H-7GYR] (discussing nonbank mortgage lenders lack of federal 
assistance compared to banks). 
98. A lender of last resort is an institution that provides liquidity insurance to the system it 
supports.  See Paul Tucker, Re-Thinking the Lender of Last Resort 12–13 (Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, BIS Papers No. 79, 2014), https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap79.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UUM8-Z6LX] (describing the role of a “lender of last resort”). 
99. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 56, at 175 (explaining the role of the discount 
window and deposit insurance in reducing risk to banks); see also Discount Window Lending, 
FED. RES. BD. (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SG9R-RGKW] (explaining the purpose and function of the discount 
window). 
100. See Platt, supra note 2 (acknowledging that no servicing advance facilities exist under 
the Federal Reserve or Treasury for nonbank mortgage servicers). 
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shortage.101  Unencumbered assets are not used to collateralize 
transactions, are available to convert into cash for funding purposes, and 
are not restricted from being used as a liquidity buffer.102  This relatively 
low amount of unencumbered assets leaves less of a buffer in the event 
of a liquidity crisis.103  The CARES Act mortgage forbearance therefore 
has a more severe effect on nonbank mortgage servicers.104  The liquidity 
risk presented will likely put strain on the resources of most nonbank 
mortgage servicers because they did not consider this risk when they 
entered into their servicing agreements.105 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Establish a Liquidity Facility to Provide for the Short-Term 
Credit Needs of Nonbank Mortgage Servicers 
The CARES Act mortgage forbearance covered 70% of all 
single-family mortgages with an unpaid principal balance of $7 trillion.106  
By the end of June 2020, over 4.2 million homeowners took advantage 
of the forbearance provided by the Act.107  Nonbank mortgage servicers 
are a significant portion of the total mortgage servicing market.108  At the 
 
101. See Kim et al., supra note 63 (stating that nonbanks have fewer unencumbered assets 
than banks do).  
102. See General Instructions: 2052b Report, FED. RES. BD. 6 (2015), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_2052b20151231_i.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C4NX-ZGES] (defining unencumbered assets). 
103. See Kim et al., supra note 63 (explaining that nonbank mortgage servicers have fewer 
unencumbered assets than bank mortgage servicers); see also Platt, supra note 2 
(acknowledging that no servicing advance facilities exist under the Federal Reserve or 
Treasury for nonbank mortgage servicers). 
104. See Kim et al., supra note 63 (explaining that nonbank mortgage servicers have fewer 
unencumbered assets than bank mortgage servicers); see also Platt, supra note 2 
(acknowledging that no servicing advance facilities exist under the Fed or Treasury for 
nonbank mortgage servicers). 
105. See Platt, supra note 2 (“[T]his liquidity risk likely strains the resources of most 
nonbank mortgage servicers, not because they lack financial strength, but because the parties 
did not realistically contemplate the impacts of required forbearance”). 
106. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (announcing statistics regarding the potential scope 
of the CARES Act mortgage forbearance). 
107. Id. 
108. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, PROPOSED REGULATORY PRUDENTIAL 
STANDARDS FOR NON-BANK MORTGAGE SERVICERS 7 (2020), 
https://www.csbs.org/system/files/2020-09/FinalProposedPrudentialStandardsForComment-
2020_1.pdf#:~:text=Nonbank%20mortgage%20servicing%20companies%20perform,Fanni
e%20Mae%20and%20Freddie%20Mac [https://perma.cc/P23J-WEL4] [hereinafter CSBS 
2020] (analyzing statistics of nonbank mortgage servicers prevalence in the agency servicing 
market). 
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beginning of 2020, nonbank mortgage servicers were responsible for 
servicing 53% of the agency servicing market.109   
The primary issue for nonbank mortgage servicers is a lack of 
liquidity to pay the principal and interest due on mortgage-backed 
securities.110  A liquidity facility to lend to these servicers would alleviate 
the overwhelming burden imposed by the CARES Act mortgage 
forbearance provision.111  This would allow nonbank mortgage servicers 
to continue to comply with the requirements of the CARES Act while 
allowing them to pay the owners of government mortgage-backed 
securities that they service.112 
The lending facility could be established by the Federal 
Reserve.113  Under the authority granted by Federal Reserve Act Section 
13(3) (“Section 13(3)”), the Federal Reserve Board can establish a 
lending facility in “unusual or exigent circumstances.”114  Pursuant to 
changes to Section 13(3) under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act,115 the facility would also need to have “broad-
based eligibility.”116  The facility would also need to grant liquidity to the 
financial system broadly, “secured sufficiently to protect taxpayers from 
losses,” with “the prior approval of the Secretary of the Treasury,” and to 
be wound up in a “timely and orderly fashion.”117  The Federal Reserve 
has established that “broad-based” means a facility that “at least five 
entities” could qualify for, and that is not designed to save failing firms.118  
 
109. See id.  (announcing statistics of nonbank mortgage servicers share of agency 
servicing in the market). 
110. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (discussing mortgage servicer liquidity concerns). 
111. See id. at 8 (recommending a liquidity facility to fund government mortgage-backed 
securities advancements for mortgage servicers to address liquidity concerns).  
112. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-
136, 134 Stat. 281, 490–91 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9056); see KAUL & TOZER, 
supra note 8, at 8 (arguing for a liquidity facility to cover government mortgage-backed 
securities advancements). 
113. See generally Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2018). 
114. Id. 
115. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101(a), 12 
U.S.C. § 343(3) (2018) (amending the authority granted under Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act). 
116. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING 18 (2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44185.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLN8-S269] (stating the “broad 
based eligibility” requirement for an emergency lending facility under Section 13(3)). 
117. See id. (stating other requirements for an emergency lending facility under Section 
13(3)).  
118. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule 
Specifying Its Procedures for Emergency Lending Under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act (Nov. 30, 2015), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151130a.htm 
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The Federal Reserve has already established lending facilities pursuant to 
its authority under Section 13(3), and there is clear statutory authority for 
another lending facility to be established in this fashion.119 
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) is a credit 
facility established under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.120  
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York committed to lend to a special 
purpose vehicle (“SPV”)121 on a “recourse basis,” and the Treasury 
agreed to take a $10 billion equity investment in the SPV.122  The SPV 
would function by purchasing “three-month U.S. dollar-denominated 
commercial paper” from issuers subject to certain restrictions.123  The 
intended effect is to increase the flow of credit and to provide liquidity to 
businesses in the commercial paper market.124 
The lending facility suggested herein would work in a similar 
fashion to the CPFF.125  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York would 
lend to a mortgage servicer SPV, and the Treasury would agree to take 
an equity investment in the SPV.126  The amounts invested would depend 
on the exact liquidity needs at the time the facility is established.127  This 
SPV would then extend lines of credit directly to nonbank mortgage 
 
[https://perma.cc/B3CR-TV6L] (defining “broad-based” within the understanding of “broad-
based eligibility” within Section 13(3)). 
119. See FED. RESERVE BD., PERIODIC REPORT: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING 
FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 
2 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/pdcf-mmlf-cpff-pmccf-smccf-
talf-mlf-ppplf-msnlf-mself-mslpf-nonlf-noelf-9-8-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7S7-N2JG] 
(reporting regarding the lending facilities established in response to the COVID-19 crisis 
under Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)). 
120. FED. RESERVE BD., COMMERCIAL PAPER FUNDING FACILITY: PROGRAM TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS 1 (2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/monetary20200723a1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/84XW-HUVP]. 
121. A special purpose vehicle is a legal entity created by a company or organization with 
its own assets, liabilities, and legal status.  What is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)?, CORP. 
FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/strategy/special-
purpose-vehicle-spv/ [https://perma.cc/EUL2-NN3Q] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021). 
122. FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 120. 
123. See id.  (stating the business of the facility and how it will function). 
124. See Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FED. RES. BD. (Dec. 11, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/cpff.htm [https://perma.cc/U9C5-5N64] 
(explaining the intended purpose of the credit facility). 
125. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (suggesting liquidity facility along the lines of CPFF 
for government loan servicers). 
126. See FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 120 (discussing structure of the CPFF). 
127. See id.  (explaining the mechanics of the CPFF); see also KAUL & TOZER, supra note 
8, at 8 (suggesting liquidity facility along the lines of CPFF for government loan servicers 
and proposing that the Treasury take an equity position to absorb credit losses). 
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servicers of federally backed mortgage loans that qualify for forbearance 
under the CARES Act, subject to certain conditions.128  
This facility would only be available for nonbank mortgage 
servicers, although bank mortgage servicers are also struggling.129  This 
facility should be enacted to prevent the collapse on the nonbank 
mortgage servicing industry because this industry lacks the liquidity 
safety nets available to bank mortgage servicers.130  This facility should 
be enacted to minimize the required resources and effectively triage the 
servicers most in need of liquidity.131  A liquidity facility must exist for 
nonbank mortgage servicers during economic crises to avoid straining the 
liquidity of the housing market, and this facility can be a template for 
solving this problem in the future.132  This facility will not run afoul of 
the Federal Reserve’s rule regarding “broad-based eligibility” as long as 
the facility is used for the purpose of preventing the collapse of the 
industry as a whole.133 
The CARES Act provides for funding for such a liquidity facility 
by creating a Treasury fund of $454 billion to be invested in Federal 
Reserve emergency facilities.134  The CARES Act  provides that the 
funds, “shall be available to make loans and loan guarantees to . . . 
facilities established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.”135  The purpose of these funds is to, “provide liquidity to the 
financial system that supports lending to eligible businesses, States, or 
municipalities.”136 
 
128. See FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 120 (explaining function of special purpose vehicle 
in the CPFF); see also KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8, at 8 (suggesting banks extend lines of 
credit to be purchased by Ginnie Mae issuers). 
129. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the suffering of all mortgage servicers under the 
forbearance). 
130. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing nonbank mortgage lenders lack of federal 
assistance compared to banks and potential crisis looming). 
131. See id. (discussing the difficulties of nonbank mortgage servicers in the current crisis); 
see also Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the suffering of mortgage servicers under the 
forbearance generally). 
132. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (stating that a liquidity crisis is coming and can be 
addressed by establishing a liquidity facility). 
133. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 118 (defining “broad-based” within 
the understanding of “broad-based eligibility” within Section 13(3)). 
134. See Peter Conti-Brown, Explaining the New Fed-Treasury Emergency Fund, 
BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/explaining-the-new-fed-
treasury-emergency-fund/ [https://perma.cc/7QSE-A55D] (explaining the CARES Act 
creation of a Treasury fund for Federal Reserve emergency facilities). 
135. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-
136, 134 Stat. 281, 470 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9042). 
136. Id. 
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The Treasury is given further authority under the CARES Act to 
appropriate funds in the Exchange Stabilization Fund137 for the purposes 
of funding any emergency facilities established under the Act.138  As of 
July 2020, the Treasury reported that there was $482 billion left in the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund, and in September 2020, the Treasury 
pledged $195 billion to support emergency facilities established by the 
Federal Reserve.139  
However, when the Relief Act was signed into law, it 
permanently rescinded the “unobligated balances made available under 
Section 4027 of the CARES Act.”140  Additionally, the Relief Act 
amended the CARES Act, and starting after December 31, 2020, it 
prevents the Federal Reserve from funding any Section 13(3) facilities 
pursuant to Section 4003(b)(4) of the CARES Act.141  As a result, the 
contemplated facility will likely require additional legislation to be 
allocated funding; however, that is almost certainly a worthwhile goal.142  
Because of the severe impact the failure of nonbank mortgage servicers 
would have on the broader economy, providing liquidity to these 
businesses is essential, and the CARES Act, at one point, provided 
funding for exactly this purpose.143 
In March 2020, the Mortgage Bankers Association (“MBA”) 
estimated that, if one-quarter of eligible borrowers chose to invoke the 
forbearance for six months, mortgage servicers would be required to 
 
137. The Exchange Stabilization Fund is established under 31 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1) for the 
purposes of “. . . investing in obligations of the United States Government . . .,” amounts in 
the fund that are not required to carry out the acts therein at the time they are passed, with the 
approval of the President.  31 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1) (2018). 
138. § 4027, 134 Stat. at 496–97. 
139. See MARC LABONTE ET AL., HOW MUCH MONEY REMAINS UNDER TITLE IV OF THE 
CARES ACT?  1 (2020), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11512#:~:text=As%20shown%20in%20Fi
gure%201,to%20%241%2C950%20billion%20to%20recipients.  [https://perma.cc/JRJ8-
4JEH] (announcing funds remaining in the ESF and the Treasury’s plans going forward). 
140. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, § 1003(a)(1) (2020) 
(“[T]he unobligated balances made available under section 4027 of the CARES Act (15 
U.S.C. 9061), $429,000,000,000 shall be permanently rescinded on the date of enactment of 
this Act.”). 
141. See Consolidated Appropriations Act § 1005(c)(1) (“After December 31, 2020, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve banks shall not 
make any loan, purchase any obligation, asset, security, or other interest, or make any 
extension of credit through any program or facility established under section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act . . . in which the Secretary made a loan, loan guarantee, or other 
investment pursuant to section 4003(b)(4) . . .”). 
142. See, e.g., Light, supra note 97 (discussing generally the potential risk posed to the 
financial system by nonbank mortgage servicers failures). 
143. § 4003(b)(4), 134 Stat. at 470; see generally Sorohan, supra note 13. 
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advance upwards of $75 to $100 billion to investors.144  The number of 
mortgages in forbearance peaked on June 15, 2020, with 8.55% of 
mortgage loans in forbearance or approximately 4.3 million 
homeowners.145  This number has subsequently declined, reaching 5.38% 
or roughly 2.7 million homeowners by February 1, 2021.146  This falls 
short of the estimated one-quarter of homeowners used in projections by 
the MBA, and well within the financial scope of the Treasury’s funds 
allocated by the CARES Act for this purpose.147  However, simply 
because the COVID-19 crisis has not been as devastating as the initially 
projected figures, there is no reason to believe it will not be in the 
future.148  This should be seen as a near miss with tragedy, and a better 
reason to create some framework to support nonbank mortgage servicers 
in times of crisis.149 
 
B. Strengthen Existing Federal Oversight and Increase Regulatory 
Measures 
 
The authority to oversee nonbank mortgage servicers currently 
lies with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).150  The 
CFPB is responsible for supervising depository institutions with over $10 
billion in assets and any affiliated companies, in addition to nonbank 
 
144. Sorohan, supra note 13. 
145. See Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, Share of Mortgage Loans in Forbearance 
Increases to 8.55% (June 15, 2020), https://www.mba.org/2020-press-releases/june/share-of-
mortgage-loans-in-forbearance-increases-to-855 [https://perma.cc/XAA6-XC3H] 
(announcing mortgage forbearance statistics the week of June 15, 2020). 
146. See Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, Share of Mortgage Loans in Forbearance 
Remains Unchanged at 5.38 Percent (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.mba.org/2021-press-
releases/february/share-of-mortgage-loans-in-forbearance-remains-unchanged-at-538-
percent [https://perma.cc/SEE8-AE5F] (announcing mortgage forbearance statistics the week 
of Feb. 1, 2021). 
147. § 4003(b)(4), 134 Stat. at 470; see also MARC LABONTE ET AL., supra note 139 
(announcing Treasury’s pledge of $195 billion to emergency facilities).  But see Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, § 1003(a)(1) (2020) (rescinding funding 
granted under the CARES Act). 
148. See Sorohan, supra note 13 (discussing the predicted figures of one-quarter of eligible 
borrowers invoking forbearance). 
149. See id. (discussing the lack of structure to help nonbank mortgage servicers).  
150. See Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 § 626(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5538(a) (2018) (“The 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection shall have the authority to prescribe rules with 
respect to mortgage loans . . . [and] enforce [those] rules . . . in the same manner, by the same 
means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties, as though all applicable terms and 
provisions of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 were incorporated into and made 
part of this subsection.”). 
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mortgage originators and servicers.151  CFPB oversight is supervisory in 
nature, and aimed at protecting consumers from “unfair or deceptive act 
or practices regarding mortgage loans.”152  The Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) stated that the CFPB lacked any means 
to create a list of nonbank mortgage servicers, and therefore, the CFPB 
does not have a full record of the companies under the scope of its 
regulation.153  The inability to identify the regulated nonbank mortgage 
servicers indicates a need for more comprehensive oversight of nonbank 
mortgage servicers under the CFPB.154 
Moreover, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”) 
proposed regulatory standards for nonbank mortgage servicers.155  These 
standards covered a broad range of topics, including capital and liquidity 
requirements.156  For larger nonbank mortgage servicers, CSBS has 
proposed a risk-weighted capital requirement.157  This new requirement, 
combined with proposed liquidity requirements, would help to limit the 
amount of risk that nonbank mortgage servicers can be subjected to and 
would insulate nonbank mortgage servicers from challenging economic 
situations.158 
The crisis to mortgage servicers was not caused directly by the 
COVID-19 crisis.159  Rather, this crisis was caused when the CARES Act 
 
151. Institutions Subject to CFPB Supervisory Authority, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/supervision-
examinations/institutions/ [https://perma.cc/BNM2-3F8F] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021). 
152. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 § 626(a). 
153. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-278, NONBANK MORTGAGE 
SERVICERS: EXISTING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT COULD BE STRENGTHENED 48 (2016), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675747.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9VR-CKE3] (analyzing the 
sufficiency of existing CFPB oversight and regulatory authority). 
154. See id.  (stating that CFPB lacks the ability to collect data on the identity of all nonbank 
servicers, in part because of a lack of federal regulation prior to the creation of the CFPB). 
155. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 65 (stating the CSBS has proposed regulatory 
standards for nonbank mortgage servicers). 
156. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, PROPOSED REGULATORY PRUDENTIAL 
STANDARDS FOR NON-BANK MORTGAGE SERVICERS 7 (2015), 
https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/MSR-
ProposedRegulatoryPrudentialStandardsforNon-BankMortgageServicers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QM9H-3XDL] [hereinafter CSBS 2015] (proposing regulatory standards 
for capital and liquidity). 
157. See id.  at 13–14 (“State regulators see a need for [nonbank mortgage servicing firms] 
to have in place advanced risk management and management information systems to mitigate 
risk.”). 
158. See id.  (proposing regulatory standards for risk-weighted capital and liquidity 
requirements to minimize likelihood of harm from financial hardships). 
159. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing how legislative action has burdened mortgage 
servicers with the economic strain of the mortgage forbearance). 
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required mortgage servicers to shoulder the burden of ensuring the safety 
and security of mortgagors, whose forbearance was unforeseeable,160 
through legislation.161  Unlike the 2008 Financial Crisis, the current crisis 
was not caused by large scale defaults in the mortgage market, but rather 
a disruption of expected payments.162  The mortgage servicing industry 
would not be in its current position but for the passage of the CARES 
Act’s mortgage forbearance provision.163 
The COVID-19 crisis was also a far greater threat than what was 
contemplated in the increased stress testing scenarios, proposed by 
Ginnie Mae, to be imposed on nonbank mortgage lenders.164  This 
suggests that regulation alone would not have prevented this mortgage 
servicer liquidity crisis if no lending facility exists to support the industry 
in times of crisis.165  However, even if increased regulation could have 
conceivably avoided the liquidity crisis that nonbank mortgage servicers 
are facing, regulators did not take the necessary steps to implement 
regulations in the lead up to the COVID-19 crisis.166 
Therefore, as a condition of access to the liquidity facility, there 
should be a mandatory assent to increased regulatory oversight of the 
nonbank mortgage servicers that choose to take advantage of the 
facility.167  However, the oversight must be greater than what the CFPB 
currently provides because these institutions need regulations that will 
promote soundness and limit the risk that they can pose to the 
economy.168  Additionally, there should be an assent to increased capital 
and liquidity standards, as contemplated by the CSBS, in order to ensure 
that risk mitigation is a part of the regulatory solution.169  This will help 
 
160. See id. (discussing how mortgage servicers are getting an unfair deal as a result of the 
CARES Act legislation and mortgage forbearance). 
161. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 
116-136, 134 Stat. 281, 490–91 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9056) (discussing how 
the mortgage forbearance was the result of legislation in response to a crisis). 
162. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing how the mortgage forbearance disrupted payments 
to mortgage servicers); see also Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 54 (stating that the financial 
crisis was caused by large scale defaults on subprime loans). 
163. § 4022, 134 Stat. at 490–91; see generally Platt, supra note 2. 
164. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing Ginnie Mae’s proposed stress tests being less 
severe than the COVID-19 crisis). 
165. See id.  (discussing Ginnie Mae’s proposed stress tests being less severe than the 
COVID-19 crisis, and implicitly arguing that proposed regulations would not have prevented 
crisis). 
166. See id.  (highlighting regulatory inaction regarding nonbank mortgage servicers lack 
of credit and liquidity in preparation for crisis). 
167. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 153. 
168. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing the risk posed by nonbank mortgage servicers). 
169. See generally CSBS 2015, supra note 156. 
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ensure that dangerous economic situations such as the COVID-19 
pandemic and the 2008 Financial Crisis do not bring nonbank mortgage 
servicers to the brink of collapse every time they occur.170  
 
C. Responses to Criticisms and Potential Concerns 
 
The primary criticism against establishing a liquidity facility for 
nonbank mortgage servicers contemplates the likelihood that nonbank 
mortgage servicers will evade the natural consequences of their own 
actions.171  No one anticipated the scope and scale of the COVID-19 
crisis, but regulators were aware of the potential for a nonbank liquidity 
crisis.172  Nonbank mortgage servicers even lobbied against stricter 
regulations and “stress testing”173 requirements being placed on them, 
arguing that their rising participation in the mortgage market did not pose 
a risk to the broader financial system.174 
The housing industry is heavily reliant on nonbank mortgage 
servicers.175  The Secretary of the Treasury has announced the creation of 
a “task force” within the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) 
to monitor nonbank mortgage servicers as a potential systemic risk to the 
broader economy, however, there has not yet been a public report on their 
findings.176  Federally backed mortgages constitute approximately 70% 
of all single family loans, a total of over 33 million loans.177  As of 2020, 
 
170. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 153. 
171. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing the foreseeability and general criticism of 
“bailing out” nonbank mortgage servicers). 
172. See id. (highlighting regulators’ awareness of the risk posed by nonbank mortgage 
servicers). 
173. Stress tests are scenarios designed to analyze the impact of a given event on the 
financial health and liquidity of the tested entity or company.  See GINNIE MAE, REQUEST FOR 
INPUT: STRESS TESTING FRAMEWORK 2, 5, 7–8, 27 (2019), 
https://www.ginniemae.gov/newsroom/publications/Documents/ginniemae_rfi_stress_testin
g.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPL2-EEFD] (“The Version 1 stress testing framework forecasts an 
issuer’s financial performance over the next eight quarters under a base and an adverse 
scenario . . .”). 
174. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing how nonbank mortgage servicers lobbied against 
increased regulations for capital and liquidity requirements). 
175. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (analyzing statistics regarding the scope of the 
mortgage forbearance provision); see also Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 54 (analyzing the 
prevalence of nonbank mortgage servicers post-financial crisis). 
176. Jesse Westbrook, Mnuchin Forms Task Force to Confront Mortgage Firms’ Liquidity, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2020, 4:37 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-
26/mnuchin-forms-task-force-to-confront-mortgage-firms-liquidity [https://perma.cc/LJ8H-
HCPF]; see Sorohan, supra note 13 (expanding on point made by Secretary of Treasury 
regarding nonbank mortgage servicers impact on the economy). 
177. KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8. 
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nonbank mortgage servicers held 53% of the agency servicing market, 
which is comprised of federally backed loans.178  Regardless of the 
culpability of nonbank mortgage servicers for the current crisis, with this 
large of a portion of the market share of mortgage servicing activities they 
cannot be allowed to fail in their current state or they could risk the 
instability of the entire housing market.179 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, nonbank mortgage servicers are a substantial portion 
of the modern mortgage servicing market.180  The COVID-19 pandemic 
has had a profound and substantial negative impact on this industry.181  
However, the mortgage servicing industry was unfairly burdened with the 
responsibility of shouldering the mortgage forbearance provision of the 
CARES Act, which they could not have reasonably anticipated.182  As a 
result of intentional legislation, nonbank mortgage servicers are facing a 
liquidity crisis that they are not equipped to deal with.183  Furthermore, 
their failure could potentially cause the entire market to collapse because 
of the substantial role nonbank mortgage servicers play in the housing 
market.184 
 
178. See CSBS 2020, supra note 108 (discussing the statistics of nonbank mortgage 
servicers share of agency servicing in the market and the how the agency servicing market 
ties in with federally backed mortgage loans). 
179.See THOMAS WADE, AM. ACTION FORUM, THE CARES ACT AND MORTGAGE 
SERVICERS 2–3 (2020), 
https://www.americanactionforum.org/print/?url=https://www.americanactionforum.org/insi
ght/the-cares-act-and-mortgage-servicers/ [https://perma.cc/W6CM-62YM] (arguing for 
relief for mortgage servicers for fears of larger and more systemic threat to the housing market 
and economy as a whole). 
180. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 34 (announcing 
statistics regarding substantial market share of nonbank mortgage servicers in the MSR & 
agency servicing market). 
181. See Kaul & Goodman, supra note 1 (analyzing the allocation of the funds provided to 
offset the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the economy); see also KAUL & TOZER, supra 
note 8. 
182. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-
136, 134 Stat. 281, 490-91 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9056); see Platt, supra note 
2 (discussing the unfair negative impact of the CARES Act mortgage forbearance provision 
on mortgage servicers). 
183. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the legislative burden placed on mortgage servicers 
by the CARES Act). 
184. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 34 (highlighting the 
substantial market share of nonbank mortgage servicers); see also WADE, AM. ACTION 
FORUM, supra note 179, at 2–3 (highlighting concerns of a collapse of the housing market). 
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Therefore, a mortgage servicing facility should be established 
because it would provide liquidity to nonbank mortgage servicers to help 
them survive the COVID-19 crisis.185  Nonbank mortgage servicers are 
in a worse position than bank mortgage servicers, who have safety nets 
to help them withstand this liquidity crisis.186  Although the contemplated 
facility will not directly benefit bank mortgage servicers, it is in the best 
interest of everyone involved to help nonbank mortgage servicers manage 




185. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the unfair negative impact of the “CARES” Act 
mortgage forbearance provision on mortgage servicers). 
186. See Light, supra note 97 (emphasizing nonbank mortgage lenders lack of federal 
“safety nets” compared to banks and potential crisis looming). 
187. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 34 (announcing 
statistics regarding substantial market share of nonbank mortgage servicers); see also WADE, 
AM. ACTION FORUM, supra note 179, at 2–3 (arguing for relief for mortgage servicers to 
prevent systemic threat to the economy). 
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